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Abstract  
Social dilemmas typically require individuals to choose between a personal need or that of 
a group, often sacrificing one for the other. Many factors play a role in whether people 
choose to cooperate or to compete, but time constraint and other time-related variables 
might be decisive in this decision-making process. This study investigated the role of these 
time variables in individuals’ choice to cooperate or compete, specifically by evaluating 
time pressure and the individuals’ worldview of time (i.e., how they perceive and think 
about their present and future). Participants (n = 220) took part in ten rounds of a social 
dilemma task (the chicken game), either in a condition with time pressure or a control 
condition. Participants also completed the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, and the 
Cooperative-Competitive Orientation Scale. As expected, rates of competition were higher 
in the experimental condition, where a 40-second timer was set after the fifth round of the 
dilemma. In fact, more competitive behavior was observed with each successive round in 
the time-pressure condition, with the last round consistently being the most competitive. 
Present and future components of the time perspective variable were positively correlated 
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with competitive behavior, but only when under time pressure. No effect was found using 
the cooperation and competition attitudes measure. These results suggest that time pressure 
increases competitive behaviors, and that time perspective is related to competition only 
when there is an explicit time constraint in the decision process. 
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Introduction 
Many problems concerning interpersonal decisions, from the individual, group or 
international level, are based on situations in which people have the possibility to cooperate 
or compete. In some cases such decision process is bounded to a time constraint, so that 
choosing between cooperate or defect needs to be made relatively fast. A driver that is late 
for work and is facing a traffic jam, or a businessperson with tight deadlines to meet, 
exemplify situations in which individuals confront a crescent time pressure, occasionally 
being forced to make decisions faster. Would such individuals, experiencing a time 
pressure situation, be more competitive than others that do not have to hurry to make their 
decisions? Additionally, would differences between the way people think about their 
present and future be related to their cooperative and competitive attitudes? In this study we 
put these questions to test, in order to deeper understand the role of time-related variables in 
specific social interactions.  
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Time constraints follow individuals in most phases of life, commonly raising 
worries and stress to those who claim being racing against the clock. Menzier (2005) argues 
that most people complain about not having enough time per day to do what they would 
like to do, and that they are working more and harder than ever. Such feelings can generate 
negative consequences, like stress and anxiety from a constant urgency in search for more 
time. Robinson and Godbey (1997) suggest that such an increase in the reports of time 
pressure could be explained by the changes in how the value of time was perceived along 
the years, such that a higher valorization of time seems to increase feelings of time pressure 
(DeVoe and Pfeffer, 2011). 
 
Time pressure 
Time pressure is commonly described as an urgency to finish a certain task or 
accomplish a certain goal, often generating feelings of anxiety, haste, and hurry (Szollos, 
2009). This phenomenon, as a stressful variable, has many consequences in the judgment 
and decision-making processes of individuals, leading to changes in their affective states 
(Maule et al., 2000) and cognitive strategies (Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981). Research shows 
that time pressure increases the speed of information processing (Ben Zur and Breznitz, 
1981; Maule and Mackie, 1990; Payne et al., 1988) and decreases risky behaviors when 
expected consequences are positive, but increases engagement in risky behavior when 
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expected consequences are negative (Busemeyer, 1985).  
As an important decision process variable, this construct has been associated with a 
set of behaviors that involve the evaluation of costs and benefits of the action. The body of 
research in prosocial behavior can also shed light on the effects of time pressure on 
cooperation, given that both involve benefits to other individuals. Darley and Batson 
(1973), for example, found that time pressure greatly reduce prosocial behavior. Since the 
main goal of hasty individuals is to reduce time constraint, they pay little attention to other 
elements, such as individuals in need of help. Also, other manipulations of cognitive 
loading, with effects similar to time pressure, reduce empathy (Davis et al., 1996). Despite 
the existence of this literature, however, the role of time pressure in situations where 
individuals have the possibility to cooperate or compete is still relatively unexplored 
 
Time perspective 
In addition to time pressure, another time-related variable that is broadly 
investigated in psychological studies is time perspective. According to the time perspective 
model, individuals differ in the way they perceive and think about their past, present, and 
future (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999; Zimbardo and Boyd, 2008). The model describes five 
components of time perspective: Positive Past, Negative Past, Present Fatalist, Present 
Hedonist and Future. Those time perspective components have been related to risky 
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behaviors (Zimbardo et al., 1997), social relationships (Lang and Carstensen, 2002), 
procrastination (Ferrari and Díaz-Morales, 2007), and preference for delayed rewards 
(Klineberg, 1968). Although the past components of time perspective are useful in 
explaining or predicting some behaviors and attitudes, such as depression, anxiety, 
unhappiness, low self-esteem and aggression (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999), in this study they 
were not used. We made this decision because this component does not appear to have a 
direct relation with the other variables of this study, therefore only the present and future 
components of the scale were used here. The Present Hedonist component concerns an 
orientation to present pleasure, with hedonistic, risk-taking, or a “feel the moment” attitude 
towards time and life. The Present Fatalist involves a fatalistic and hopeless attitude toward 
future and life. Present oriented individuals have been found to be more prone to engage in 
risky behaviors (Zimbardo et al., 1997), to procrastinate activities (Ferrari and Díaz-
Morales, 2007), and to develop pathological gambling behavior (Hodgins and Engel, 2002). 
Also, the present components have been positively associated with aggression, anxiety and 
ego undercontrol, and negatively associated with consideration of future consequences 
(Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Finally, the Future component regards an attitude focused on 
future events, characterized by goal achievement, planning and future rewards. This 
component has been associated with social goals (Lang and Carstensen, 2002), academic 
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achievement (De Volder and Lens, 1982), preferences for delayed rewards (Klineberg, 
1968) and higher rates of sustainable behavior (Corral-Verdugo et al., 2006). 
Those studies provide some elucidation to how time pressure and time perspective 
would be related to cooperation, but is important to take into account that despite being 
similar, cooperation and prosociality show relevant differences (Penner, et al., 2005). In the 
decision-making process of cooperation, the individual needs to evaluate the odds that 
others involved in the situation will also cooperate, or otherwise compete. In such a 
scenario, competition is characterized as a risky behavior, because the outcome can be 
negative, if all the participants involved compete. Situations like these are often described 




Research that investigates cooperation and competition typically use social 
dilemmas as a methodological tool for accessing objective measures of such behaviors 
(Biel et al., 2008). Social dilemmas are situations of conflict between immediate self-
interest and long-term collective interests (Van Lange et al., 2013). The tragedy of the 
commons, a social dilemma proposed by Hardin (1968), illustrates a social dilemma with 
an ecological example. It involves a shared renewable resource, that can be easily depleted 
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if users behave selfishly, taking a large part of the resource for themselves in a short period 
of time. Such a situation exemplifies a social dilemma because all participants need to 
collaborate in order to preserve the resource availability. However, there is always the 
possibility that some users will get a larger quantity of the resource within an ever-
increasing rate of consumption. There is, therefore, a need for a trust-based relation 
between those engaged in the dilemma.  
In this study we chose to use the chicken game (Bornstein et al., 1997), referred 
sometimes as the snow-drift dilemma. Such dilemma offers two individuals the opportunity 
to cooperate or to defect, whereas the combination of their choices defines their outcomes. 
If both players cooperate, they receive a slightly positive outcome. If one defects while the 
other cooperates, the one defecting receives a larger reward than the one that cooperated. 
Finally, if both players defects, both receive the worst possible outcome. This situation 
reflects a social dilemma because defection is favorable when the other player cooperates, 
but such decision implies on a reduced overall pay-off for the group. We chose to use the 
chicken game instead of the most commonly used prisoner’s dilemma (a similar dilemma, 
but with different outcomes proportions) because the former has higher cooperation rates 
(Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Kümerlli et al., 2007). Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is 
a better approach to test the effects of time related variables on cooperation and 
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competition. 
A set of studies by Rand, Greene and Nowak (2012) found that time pressure 
increases cooperation rates in a social dilemma. However, their method was an one-shot 
public goods dilemma, where time pressure manipulation was the amount of time lapsed 
before participants made a decision (therefore, a more intuitive-based decision). In this 
study we propose a different manipulation of time pressure, offering participants a situation 
where time pressure increases continually, while observing its effects on cooperation. We 
expected that the frequency of cooperative behaviors would decrease as time pressure 
increases, given that time constraints often reduces prosocial behavior (Darley and Batson, 
1973), while other cognitive load tasks reduce empathy (Davis et al., 1996). 
Hypotheses 
In this study we propose to verify the relations between time pressure and time 
perspective with cooperation and competition, both with behavioral (choices in the social 
dilemma) and attitudinal measures. A mixed experimental design was used to test four main 
hypotheses: a) Elevated rates of time pressure would increase rates of competition behavior 
in the social dilemma. b) Time perspective would be related to competition behavior in the 
social dilemma, with present-oriented individuals being more competitive than future-
oriented. c) Time perspective would be related to cooperation and competition attitudes, 
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with present-oriented individuals presenting more competitive attitude than future-oriented. 
d) Cooperation and competition attitudes would also be related to cooperation and 
competition behaviors in the social dilemma. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
A sample of 230 Brazilian students (58% female) participated in this experiment, of 
which 108 were from a large public university and 122 from two public high schools. We 
choose to get data from those distinct locations for both variability and convenience 
purposes. Participants’ mean age was 18.5 years (SD = 4.22). They were arranged in 115 
dyads, randomly allocated to one of two conditions: Time Pressure (n = 58) and No-Time 
Pressure (control) (n = 57).  
Participants were recruited personally or by phone, and asked to provide their 
consent. Both the social dilemma and the attitudinal measures were administered to all 
participants. In order to control for possible order effects, the presentation of the social 
dilemma and the attitudinal measures were counter-balanced. Each session lasted about 30 
minutes. Participation in the study was voluntary and confidential.  
 
Social dilemma 
Cooperation and competition behaviors were measured by participants' decisions in 
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a chicken-game dilemma. The outcomes in the dilemma were given in R$1.00, the 
Brazilian currency (approximately half a US dollar). However, participants were warned 
that they would not keep the money after the end of the experiment. The pay-off matrix was 
as follows: if both players cooperated they received two coins each; if one cooperated while 
the other competed, the one who cooperated received one coin and the one who competed 
received three coins; if both competed, both lost one coin (see Table 1). 
 






A game instructor was responsible for coordinating the game, taking notes of 
players' moves and distributing pay-offs in coins after each interaction. A chart was used to 
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show the pay-off matrix to the players, and to help explain the procedure. The game was 
played for ten rounds, while participants faced each other. For each interaction players had 
to indicate whether they wanted to cooperate or defect, by choosing a card to signal their 
choice. After each interaction the coordinator distributed the outcomes in coins to the 
players, according to the pay-off matrix. 
In the Time Pressure condition a computer screen with a timer, which counted down 
the seconds left for the task, was placed near the participants. This was used to elicit an 
increasing feeling of time pressure in the dilemma. Before the game started, participants 
were told that the chronometer would eventually start its regressive count, signaling that 
they would have only 40 seconds left to play. The chronometer always started after the fifth 
interaction, but participants were unaware of when it would start. Only games that lasted 
ten interactions were considered for analysis. In the Control condition there was no 
chronometer and participants played all ten rounds normally. Therefore, only the last five 
rounds of the game differed between the two experimental conditions. To compare for 
differences between the Time Pressure and the Control conditions only data from the last 
five rounds was analyzed, since the time pressure manipulation started only in the fifth 
round and until there both conditions were completely similar. To other analysis not 




 A Brazilian version (Milfont et al., 2008) of the Zimbardo Time Perspective 
Inventory - ZTPI (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999; Sircova et al., 2014) was used to measure 
individual differences in time orientation. Items are accessed on a 5-point Likert scale, 
according to how characteristic a statement is for the respondent, ranging from 1 (very 
uncharacteristic) to 5 (very characteristic). Originally, it includes five components: positive 
past, negative past, present-hedonistic, present-fatalistic, and future. However, only present 
and future time orientations were used in this study. The Future component of the scale has 
12 items (α = .74), such as “I complete projects on time by making steady progress”. The 
Present-Hedonistic component has 11 items (α = .73), such as “I take risks to put 
excitement in my life”. The Present-Fatalist component has nine items (α = .73), such as 
“My life path is controlled by forces I cannot influence”. 
An adapted version of the Cooperative-Competitive Orientation Scale (Stapel and 
Koomen, 2005), was used to obtain a measure of cooperation and competition attitudes of 
the participants. The scale has 11 items, including statements such as “It annoys me when 
other people perform better than I do”. Each item is rated from 1 (very 
untrue/uncharacteristic) to 5 (very true/characteristic). A single component of the scale 
measuring Competition was used (α = .67). Participants also provided their demographic 
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information at the end of the questionnaires. 
 
Results 
 We began our analysis by testing the effects of administration order (first the social 
dilemma or the attitudinal measures) and sample location (university or high schools) as 
possible confounding variables. The hypotheses concerning time pressure, time perspective 
and competition were mainly tested through mean comparisons and correlational analysis. 
On each trial of the social dilemma, individual cooperative choices were scored as 1 and 
competitive choices were scored as 2. An average of those choices was used as a 
competitive rate index. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the sample. 









choices(rounds 1 to 5)  
Mean (SD) 
Competitive choices 






4.84 (2.29) 1.45(0.24) 1.54(0.24) 






5.05(2.42) 1.58(0.23) 1.58(0.25) 
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The administration order did not affect competition rates in the social dilemma (t = 
0.25, p = 0.80). Also, the order did not affect the competition attitudes scores (t = 1.04, p = 
0.30) nor the Future and Present Hedonist components of the ZTPI (t = 0.79, p = 0.23 and t 
= 1.21, p = 0.43, respectively). However, participants who first completed the attitudinal 
questionnaires showed higher scores in the Present Fatalist component of the ZTPI (t(228) 
= 4.00, p < 0.001, r = 0.25), therefore this effect was controlled for in the subsequent 
analyses concerning this component. When compared to high school students, university 
students showed less competitive behavior in the dilemma (t(228) = 5.14, p < 0.001, r = 
0.32), lower scores in Present Fatalist component (t(228) = 7.94, p < 0.001, r = 0.46) and 
higher scores in Future component (t(228) = 1.81, p = 0.07, r = 0.11). Based on these 
results, sample location was also controlled for in subsequent analyses. 
 
Time pressure and competition 
Given that time pressure manipulation started only after the fifth round of the 
dilemma, only the last five interactions differed between the conditions. An analysis of 
these last interactions indicated that the frequency of competitive choices was higher in the 
Time Pressure condition when compared to the Control condition, F(1, 208) = 6.76, p = 
0.01, ηp2 = 0.03. Also, while evaluating the competitive rates in the last interaction of the 
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game - when time pressure would be at the highest point - we found that in the Time 
Pressure condition the competition was even higher than in the Control condition, F(1, 208) 
= 7.94, p = 0.005 e ηp² = 0.04.  
 
Attitudinal measures and competition 
Correlations between time perspective components and the rates of competition in 
the entire game were significant only for the Present Hedonist component (r = 0.12, p = 
0.04). However, when analyzing these relationships in the experimental conditions 
separately, positive correlations were found in the Time Pressure condition for the Present 
Fatalist (r = 0.25, p = 0.008), Present Hedonist (r = 0.18, p = 0.04) and Future (r = 0.17, p = 
0.05). In the Control condition only the relationship between Present Fatalist and 
competition rates was statistically significant (r = -0.17, p = 0.03). No significant 
correlations were found between the competition attitude measure and the time perspective 
components (smallest p = 0.18). Finally, no relationship was found between the 
competition attitudes and competition behavior in the social dilemma (p = 0.24). 
 
Discussion 
We tested four hypotheses regarding the effects of time pressure and time perspective 
in competition and cooperation, both at behavioral and attitudinal levels: a) A time pressure 
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situation would increase the likelihood of competition in a social dilemma; b) Individuals 
with higher Present Hedonist or Present Fatalist orientation would compete more in the social 
dilemma, while the more Future oriented would show less rates of competition; c) The 
Present Hedonist and Present Fatalist perspectives would be related to more competitive 
attitudes, while the Future perspective would be related to less competitive attitudes; d) The 
competition attitudes would be related to competitive behavior in a social dilemma. 
Our findings suggest that when exposed to a time pressure situation, individuals 
facing a social dilemma assume a more competitive stance, which is maximized when time 
pressure is at higher levels. These results provide evidence that individuals are prone to 
compete more for a resource if access to such reward is compromised by a time constraint. 
Because individuals running against the clock focus on their own needs at the expense of 
others' needs (Darley and Batson, 1973), the observed outcome is less cooperation. Also, this 
result supports the findings that time pressure increases risky behavior when the expected 
values are negative (Busemeyer, 1985), given that competing in a social dilemma involves a 
risky decision. However, those results should be analyzed with caution, given the small effect 
size of our manipulation (ηp² = 0.04). Further studies using different cooperation and 
competition situations, as well as other time constraint manipulations are needed to further 
test this effect. 
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We found significant relationships with competition rates and time perspective only 
under a time pressure situation. Such finding suggests that individual differences in time 
perspective only seem to influence competition in situations involving time constraints. As 
predicted, individuals that are more Present Fatalist and Present Hedonist oriented were more 
competitive in the social dilemma, supporting the evidence that these time perspectives are 
related to risky behavior (Zimbardo el al., 1997), to less commitment with sustainable 
behavior (Corral-Verdugo et al., 2006), as well as to little attention to future consequences 
(Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). The present study adds that such substantial orientation to 
present, and little concern for future consequences, are also related to competition behavior.  
In contrast to our second hypothesis, Future oriented individuals were also more 
competitive. This is a puzzling result, since future oriented individuals are more eager to 
choose for a long term and a big reward, in detriment for an immediate but smaller one 
(Klineberg, 1968; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Such long term profit in a social dilemma is 
better reached by cooperating rather than competing (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). It may be 
further hypothesized that future oriented individuals also compete more because such 
dimension per se is related to a greater search for feelings of accomplishment and fulfillment 
(De Volder and Lens, 1982), which can be achieved by competing more and maximizing 
consumption. Furthermore, this result may also be explained by the relation between future 
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orientation and less procrastination, which would increase the tendency of future oriented 
individuals to maximize their welfare through competition (Brocas and Carrillo, 2001, 
Ferrari and Díaz-Morales, 2007).  
The competition attitude measure was not related to any dimensions of time 
perspective nor with the competition behavior in the social dilemma. The absence of relations 
between attitudes and behaviors are recurrent in psychological studies, and the same apply 
to studies concerning competition in attitudinal and behavioral levels (Burton-Chellew and 
West, 2013), as well as in laboratory and real-case studies on social dilemmas (Van Lange el 
al., 2013). Still, the absence of relations between competition attitudes and dimensions of 
time perspective was an unexpected result. In any case, is relevant to point that the 
competition attitudes scale showed less than robust psychometric properties, which could 
mask any possible relations that real competition attitudes could have with other variables. 
The use (or construction) of better suited scales to measure competition attitudes is 
recommended. Also, we found appropriate psychometric properties in the Brazilian version 
of the ZTPI scale, adding further evidence for reliability to this adapted instrument (Milfont 
et al., 2008).  
Further investigation on how time related factors affect cooperation and competition 
can be explored by including other variables and manipulations. A possible moderator of the 
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effect between time pressure and competition rates is the value that individuals assign to time 
itself (DeVoe and Pfeffer, 2011). It is reasonable to predict that a higher valorization of time 
would imply in even higher competition rates in situations involving time constraints, but 
this has yet to be properly tested. 
In sum, our study indicates that individuals are more eager to compete when under 
time pressure, and that time perspective slightly predicts competition in situations involving 
time. For example, when defining strategies in organizational contexts, one could recognize 
the role of time and time pressure for creating a more cooperative environment (Roe et al., 
2009). In the production industry, time-based competition is needed when choosing among 
manufacturing products possibilities (Hum and Sim, 1996). Also, in the planning of transit 
policies is relevant to take into account how a time pressure context can increase competition 
behavior among pedestrians and drivers (Lucas and Heady, 2002). Furthermore, elucidating 
how time related variables are associated to cooperative and competitive behaviors can make 
a significant contribution to the literature on time management (Ulferts et al., 2013). As high 
levels of time pressure exist in virtually all realms of life (Menzier, 2005), this study opens 
several doors for potential application 
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